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Louisiana Civil Law as Applied to
Life Insurance
Leon S. Cahn*
Louisiana, alone among the states of the Union, derives its
structure of private law from the civil law of France, from the
same origins as the French Code Napoleon. Those states which
owe their community property systems to their Spanish antecedents nevertheless take the remainder of their precedents
largely from the common law.
On the other hand, in Louisiana the French civil law, as
embodied in the civil code, is the background of almost every
private relationship. Therefore, in treating of the effect of Louisiana law upon the rules of life insurance, it is not sufficient to
consider only the community property system. Other civil law
doctrines, such as those of forced heirship and other restrictions
upon donations, must be taken into parallel account, since the
interpretations by the courts involve the entire philosophy of
the civil law.'
And yet, although the civil code, adapted from the Code
Napoleon, purports to regulate, all inclusively, the ordinary functions of property rights, nevertheless, the courts have disposed
of problems involving life insurance outside the framework of
the code more often than within it. Exceptions to the general
civil law principles, and exceptions to these exceptions, are not
uncommon in the jurisprudence.
COMUNITY PROPERTY
As in the states tracing their origins from the Spanish law,
Louisiana considers as community property everything acquired
* A.B. (1923) and LL.B. (1925), Tulane University; Member, Louisiana Bar.
This article is reprinted with the author's permission from the June, 1951,
issue of the Journal of the American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters,
3924 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.
1. See Dart, The Place of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 4 Tulane L. Rev.
163, 172 (1930). For a historical analysis of the Louisiana sources, see Nabors,
Civil Law Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L.
Rev. 369 (1932); Nabors, Life Insurance Problems Under the Community
Property System, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 515 (1932).
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during marriage, except that received by inheritance or gift to
2
one of the spouses alone.
And yet, strangely enough, life insurance proceeds are not
community property except under certain sets of facts. Seventyfive years ago the Supreme Court of Louisiana made it clear that
an insured could name any beneficiary he saw fit or change the
beneficiary, if permitted by the insurer. 3 The proceeds of life
insurance payable to the wife and children of the insured are no
part of the matrimonial community. 4 Where the wife receives
proceeds of a policy as beneficiary, she does so only under the
terms of the contract, and not because of any marital right.5 Nor,
unless the policy is made payable to the estate of the insured, do
the proceeds fall into his succession in any manner.6
The keystone of the jurisprudence holding life insurance no
part of the community nor of the estate of the deceased is, oddly
enough, based upon an interpretation of a codal provision unconnected with the rules of community property. The civil code
prohibits those who have lived together in open concubinage
from making to each other gifts or legacies of any real estate,
and of personalty beyond ten per cent of their estate. 7 This limitation applies regardless of the marital status of the donor and
2. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870: "This partnership or community
consists of the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife, and of the estate which
they may acquire during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to
them both, or by purchase or in any other similar way, even although the
purchase be only in the name of one of the two and not of both, because in
that case the period of time when thb purchase is made is alone attended to,
and not the person who made the purchase. But damages resulting from
personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this community, but shall
always be and remain the separate property of the wife and recoverable by
herself alone; provided where the injuries sustained by the wife result in her
death, the right to recover damages shall be as now provided for by existing
laws."
For a discussion at length of the Louisiana community property system,

in comparison with that of other states, see Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana (1945).
3. Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874).
4. Tutorship of Crane, 47 La. Ann. 896 (1895).
5. Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913); Douglass v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society, 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922); Succession of Crouch,
8 La. App. 86 (1928).
6. Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).
7. Art. 1481, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Those who have lived together in
open concubinage are respectively incapable of making to each other, whether
inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of immovables; and if they make a
donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of
their estate.
"Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule."

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

I [VOL.

XII

can be urged by any heir. In New York Life InsuranceCompany
v. Neal,8 the insured had abandoned his wife, who later divorced
him, and lived with a concubine; shortly before his death he took
out insurance on his life in favor of his mistress. On his death,
his legitimate children attacked the designation of the beneficiary,
and the court held that they were entitled to nine-tenths of the
proceeds. This decision, contrary to all of the earlier jurisprudence holding insurance payable to a named beneficiary unaffected by the rules of the civil law, remained the last word of
the supreme court for twenty-five years, although in the meantime it was criticized in a lower appellate court.9 Then, in 1930,
the supreme court had occasion to restudy the Neal decision in
Sizeler v. Sizeler.'0 After reviewing the earlier jurisprudence,"
the court specifically overruled the Neal holding and reestablished the doctrine as to proceeds payable to a named beneficiary
"that the policy or its proceeds never formed any part of the
estate of the deceased."
Guided by the doctrine of the Sizeler decision, the courts of
Louisiana have repeatedly maintained the named beneficiary as
entitled to the proceeds, against attacks by the surviving spouse;
a widow has no right against the proceeds payable to her husband's mother,12 to his illegitimate children, 13 or to his concu4
bine.1
Where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved in the
contract, no beneficiary acquires any vested right in the policy
until the death of the insured, 5 and the wife has no greater
vested interest than any other beneficiary. When she receives
the proceeds as last named beneficiary, she does so by the terms
of the policy and for the benefit of her separate estate, but so
long as her husband lives, her "interest was defeasible, in that
8. 114 La. 652, 38 So. 485 (1905).
9. Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55 (1914).
10. 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
11. See authorities cited at length in Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).
12. Pearce v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 12 La. App. 608, 125 So.
776 (1930).
13. Chance v. Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias, 13 La. App. 362, 125 So.
894 (1930).
14. Grayson v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 144 So. 643 (La. App. 1932).
15. Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874); Alba v. Provident
Savings Life Assurance Society, 118 La. 1021, 43 So. 663 (1907); Dorsett v.
Thomas, 152 La. 60, 92 So. 734 (1922); Berry v. Franklin State Bank, 186 La.
623, 173 So. 126 (1937).
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the husband might change the beneficiary
u6
feat it.'

and thereby de-

INSURANCE PAYABLE TO ESTATE

A different analysis is necessary where the policy is payable
to the estate of the insured. The proceeds of such a policy do
form part of his estate at death, and whether such proceeds fall
into the community property or form part of the separate estate
of the insured, depends upon whether the contract was made
during the marriage or when the insured was single, and the
marital status of the insured at the time of his death is of no
consequence. Thus, if the policy is taken cut during marriage,
payable to the executors, administrators and assigns of the husband, and the wife survives him, the proceeds fall into the community, and the wife is entitled to one-half. 1'7 Even if the wife
predeceases the insured husband, such insurance is held to fall
into the community which had existed, and the wife's heirs are
entitled to h%- half of the proceeds.' 8 And, if the spouses have
become divorced, proceeds of insurance taken out during marriage, payable to the insured's executor, are still part of the dissolved community, of which the divorced wife may claim half.19
On the other hand, if the policy has been taken out before
marriage, payable to the estate of the insured, the proceeds
even
be-ong to his separate estate and not to the community,
20
though he was married at the time of his death.
16. Douglass v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834
(1922).
17. Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902).
18. Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917).
Here, one policy was originally payable to the wife, and, after her death,
changed to insured's estate. Other policies were issued payable to the wife,
or, if she did not survive the insured, to his estate, and were left unchanged.

The court drew no distinction, treating all proceeds as payable to the estate,
by the contracts.
19. Berry v. Franklin State Bank, 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937).
This case illustrates the emphasis which the supreme court places upon

the naming of a beneficiary, and the reservation of the right to change. The
policy was originally made payable to the wife herself, and later changed to
the estate of the insured. Had the husband changed the beneficiary to name
a third party, instead of his estate, the wife would have had no claim to the

proceeds. See cases cited note 14, supra. All cases seem to turn on the question of the beneficiary at the moment of death. If it is a certain person,
either originally named or to whom a change is made, that beneficiary takes
the proceeds to the exclusion of all others. If the ultimate beneficiary is the
insured's estate, the date of issuance of the policy is consulted to determine
whether or not the proceeds are community property.

20. Succession of Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886); Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189
So. 118 (1939). In the latter case, the insurance was payable, originally, to
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EFFECT OF PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS

As under any community property system, the premiums on
life insurance policies are almost always paid out of community
funds. This source of the premiums does not in itself, however,
give the surviving spouse or the community any right to the proceeds of the policy as a death claim. The basis of this principle
was established in several early cases in which creditors of the
husband, who died insolvent, attempted to have proceeds made
payable to the wife held to be community property and subject
to their claims; the court rejected the theory that the payment
of the premiums out of community funds made the sums received
on the policies part of the community property, and maintained
the proceeds belonged separately to the wife as named beneficiary. 21 Somewhat later it was held that the wife, as beneficiary
under such policy, was not even accountable to the husband's
creditors for the premiums paid from community sources. 22 The
logical development of this theory resulted in the denial to the
wife, and to the community, of any interest in the proceeds by
23
reason of premium payments out of the community.
However, accountability for the amount of the premiums
paid on policies payable to the estate, as distinguished from any
interest in the proceeds, has been clearly established. Where
the policy was taken out before marriage and made payable to
the estate of the insured, the proceeds fall, as has been previously
seen, into the separate estate of the insured, but his estate owes
the community a refund of any premiums paid during the marriage.2 4 When the insurance is taken out during the marriage
and made payable to the estate of the insured, the prior death of
the wife does not take' the proceeds out of the community; they
belong one-half to the estate of the husband and one-half to the
estate of the wife, but the wife's heirs owe the estate of the husband one-half of the premiums paid by the husband subsequent
the insured's father, or, if he did not survive the insured, to the estate. Here,
as in Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917), the court considered
the proceeds payable to the estate, as beneficiary at the moment of death,
under the terms of the policy.
21. Succession of Clark, 27 La. Ann. 269 (1875); Succession of Bofenschen,
29 La. Ann. 711 (1877)).
22. Succession of Brownlee, 44 La. Ann. 917 (1892).

23. Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); Succession of
Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939).
24. Ibid.
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to his wife's death and out of his separate estate. 25 The same rule
applies where the marriage is dissolved, not by the death of the
wife, but by divorce; the wife, who is entitled to one-half of the
proceeds of the contract taken out during marriage and payable
to the husband's estate, must refund to the husband's heirs one26
half of the premiums paid subsequent to the divorce.
The supreme court has not yet had an occasion to fix the
accountability for premiums paid out of community funds where
the policy is in favor of a named beneficiary, other than the wife.
It has been established that where the insurance is payable to
the wife and the premiums come from community sources, the
amounts so paid are considered as a donation by the husband, in
27
favor of the wife, to the extent of his community half thereof.
In a situation where the husband takes out insurance on himself
and makes it payable to a third party, using community funds
for the premiums, it will probably be held that the separate estate
of the husband will be indebted to the community for the funds
so used. The civil code designates the husband as head and master of the community, but makes him, on the dissolution of the
marriage, accountable for any donations of community property made to the disadvantage of the wife. 28 It should, therefore,
follow that premiums paid on this type of insurance would be
constiued as donations to her detriment and subject to restitution out of the husband's estate. An exception would probably
be recognized in the case of insurance payable to children of the
marriage, since the husband may make a donation out of com29
munity funds for their benefit.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917).
Berry v. Franklin State Bank, 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937).
Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The husband is the head and

master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects,
disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an
onerous title, without the consent and permission of his wife.

"He can make no conveyance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of the
immovables of the community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the movables, unless it be for the establishment of the children of the marriage. A

gratuitous title within the contemplation of this article, embraces all titles
wherein there is no direct, material advantage to the donor.
"Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects by a gratuitous and
particular title, to the benefit of all persons.
"But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common prop-

erty, or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may
have her action against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in

one-half of the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud."
29. Ibid.
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INSURANCE ON WIFE

It has been so far presupposed that the insurance under discussion was upon the life of the husband, taken out by him, and
paid for by him out of community money. Whether a different
result as to the accountability for premiums would come about
where the wife takes out insurance on her life in favor of a
third party beneficiary, and uses community property for the
premium payments, has not been considered by the courts. One
writer"° suggests that it is possible to consider the half of the
proceeds representing the wife's community share as an effective
gift to the beneficiary but that, if the husband's consent to the
use of the community funds could be proved, he would have no
claim to the proceeds. It might be more consistent to recognize
that the wife has the same right as the husband to contract for
insurance upon her life, payable to whom she pleases and that,
if she uses community funds for this purpose, she, or her separate
estate, is accountable for the amounts paid in premiums, exactly
as in the case of insurance by the husband. Of course, if it is
shown that the husband participated, expressly or impliedly, in
the payment of the premiums, such expenditure would probably
be considered as gifts by the husband for the benefit of the wife's
separate estate to the extant of his half interest in the funds.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

Other than liability for restitution of premiums, as above
discussed, the only effect that payment of premiums out of community funds appears to have produced is in connection with the
proportion of the proceeds of the policy subject to the Federal
Estate Tax. In deLappe v. Commissioner,3 1 it was held that only
one-half of the proceeds of policies payable to named beneficiaries
was taxable under the Internal Revenue Code3 2 where the premiums had been paid out of community funds, since the spouse
of the insured was held to have paid half of the premiums. The
effect of this decision was'nullified by the Revenue Act of 1942,
taxing the entirety of all community interests.33 The Revenue
Act of 1948,14 reinstating the community property division for
estate tax purposes, has undoubtedly revived the effect of the
deLappe decision.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Nabors, supra note 2, at 546.
113 F. 2d 48 (5th Cir., 1940).
26 U.S.C.A. § 811(g) (1948).
56 Stat. 941, 942, 944, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 811(d), (e), (f), (g) (1948).
62 Stat. 116, 123, 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(d)(5), (e)(2), (g)(4), (j) (1948).
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CASH SURRENDER VALUE

One question which has not had the attention of the Louisiana courts is the disposition of the cash surrender value of
policies taken out during the marriage and paid for with community funds. If the husband is the owner of policies issued
during the marriage, regardless of to whom payable; it would
seem that all values received upon surrender during the existence
of the marriage would fall into the community, as the surrendered policies would then lose their sui generis character, and
the values received would become part "of the estate which they
might acquire during the marriage." 35 A different problem arises
when the community is dissolved by the death of the wife before
that of the insured husband, or by divorceAIs the cash surrender
value of the policies to be treated as a community asset at the
moment of such dissolution? In the only recorded case where
such a question might have arisen, the issue was not raised nor
was it considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Following a
divorce, the wife was ordered to deliver to the husband policies
in which she was named as beneficiary, but in which the right to
change the beneficiary was reserved to him. The court based its
holding solely upon the theory that the beneficiary of a life insurance policy has no vested interest in the contract where the right
of change is reserved. No contention was raised as to account6
ability for the cash surrender value.A
In the light of what has
been hereinabove considered, it is probable that the cash surrender value would belong to the owner of the policy who had
the right to change the beneficiary, subject to accountability for
the premiums paid during the marriage in accordance with the
decisions previously discussed.
For federal estate tax purposes, however, the cash surrender
values of policies on the life of the husband are treated as part
of the community property. Thus, when the insurance was payable to the husband's estate, and the wife died before him, the
board of tax appeals has held that the cash surrender value at
the time of her death was a fund, realizable in cash at the will
of the insured, created by premiums paid during marriage, and,
therefore, community property, one-half of which was taxable
37
in her estate.
35. Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of 1870.

36. Pollock v. Pollock, 164 La. 1077, 115 So. 275 (1928).
37. Estate of Louisa M. Carroll v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 11 (1933). See
26 U.S.C.A. § 811 (1948).
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The Bureau of Internal Revenue takes the further position,
in practice, that, even where the policy is made payable to a
named beneficiary, one-half of the cash surrender value falls into
the wife's estate when she predeceases her insured husband, on
the theory that one-half the premiums were paid out of her share
of the community, relying on the holding in deLappe v. Commissioner.38
The Bureau of Internal Revenue does, nevertheless, recognize one factor of deduction, after taxing half of the cash surrender value in the wife's estate. If the insured husband dies
within five years after the death of his wife, this one-half of the
cash surrender value is deductible from the proceeds includible
39
in his estate, as property previously taxed.
FORCED HEIRSHIP AND COLLATION

Turning now from the community property problems, the
Louisiana underwriter and practitioner must consider other principles inherited from French sources. Among these are the
doctrines of forced heirship and of collation, which affect part,
although not all, of the scope of insurance. These rules limit, to
certain degrees, the flexibility of life and annuity contracts.
"Forced heirs" are those relatives who may not be deprived
of certain portions of one's estate reserved for them by law.40
Children must receive a minimum share of their ancestors' prop38. There is considerable doubt as to the soundness of this treatment of
such values for estate tax purposes, particularly when the policy is payable
to other beneficiaries than the estate of the husband. For example, since the
wife has no vested interest in the insurance as long as the husband lives
and reserves the right of change, she could have no power to dispose of any
of the cash surrender value by will, nor could her intestate heirs claim it was
part of her estate. The conflict between the approach of the Louisiana courts,
in applying the principles of community property rights at civil law, and that
of the federal courts, in enforcing tax liability, is not unusual. Compare
Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So. 2d 475 (1943) and Fernandez v.
Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
39. 26 U.S.C.A. § 812(c) (1948). The amendment of this section by the
Revenue Act of 1948 disallows the deduction on property received from a prior
decedent who Was the decedent's spouse. However, unless the insured husband was the heir of his predeceased wife's share in the community, he would
not have received anything from her estate, and this amendment ought not
to operate against his estate except when he had been such heir.
40. Art. 1495, La. Civil Code of 1870: "In the cases prescribed by the two
last preceding articles, the heirs are called forced heirs, because the donor
can not deprive them of the portion of his estate reserved for them by law,
except in cases where he has a just cause to disinherit them."
(Disinherison, Articles 1617-1624, is restricted to limited causes, and is so
difficult to enforce that, for the purposes of this discussion, it can be excluded
from consideration.)
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erty.41 If a person leaves no children, but his parents survive
him, they become forced heirs for a portion of the estate.42 The
''48
share reserved to the forced heir is known as his "legitime.
Collation is the exercise of the doctrine that equality should
be naturally observed between children and other lawful descendants in the estate of an ancestor; 44 those who have received
gifts inter vivos in advance of their share must account for the
value thereof in the division of the estate, 45 unless the donor has
expressed his intention that the gift was an extra portion. 46 Even
such declared extra portion may not encroach upon the legitime
47
of the other forced heirs.
True, it has been held that neither of these two doctrines,
forced heirship nor collation, applies to the proceeds of life insurance policies. 48 The naming of a life insurance beneficiary, and
the exclusive right of such beneficiary to the proceeds, is thus not
interfered with by these rules. But there are other problems
raised by these aspects of the civil law; by the same token, opportunities for the intelligent use of life insurance for special purposes are afforded.
41. Art. 1493, La. Civil Code of 1870:

"Donations inter vivos or mortis

causa can not exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves,

at his decease, a legitimate child; one-half, if he leaves two children; and
one-third, if he leaves three or a greater number.
"Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever degree
they be, it being understood that they are only counted for the child they

represent."
Forced heirship is so embedded in Louisiana legal philosophy that the
legislature, which otherwise has power to amend the civil code, may not pass
any law abolishing forced heirship. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16.
42. Art. 1494, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Donations inter vivos or mortis
causa can not exceed two-thirds of the property, if the disposer, having no
children, leave a father, mother or both."
For a discussion of the historical background of both forced heirship and

collation, see Nabors, supra note 2, at 387.
43. Cox v. Von Ahlefeldt, 50 La. Ann. 1266, 23 So. 959 (1898).

44.
45.
46.
47.

Art. 1229, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Art. 1227, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Art. 1231, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Ibid.

48. Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928),

where it was said: "It is the settled jurisprudence of this court that life
insurance policies are neither donations inter vivos nor mortis causa, and
that the provisions of the Civil Code relative to donations and collation will
not be applied to such policies." Citing numerous earlier cases. The Louisiana legislature, by Act 292 of 1940, enacted this doctrine into statutory law,
declaring that donations inter vivos of life insurance policies, and the naming
of beneficiaries therein, whether revocably or irrevocably, are not governed
by any of the provisions of the civil code relative to the form of donations.
This provision was carried, verbatim, into the 1950 Revised Statutes as Title
22, Section 1521.
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The problems should be first considered. It can be anticipated that, before long, it will be contended that the premiums
paid on life contracts, as distinguished from the proceeds of the
policies, are gifts in favor of the beneficiary and, accordingly,
subject to the rules of forced heirship and of collation. Simple
illustrations will demonstrate the problem. Suppose a father,
having three children, takes out life insurance payable to a third
person and uses all of his resources to pay the premiums, so that
he leaves no estate at his death. Since, as previQusly pointed
out,49 premiums paid are considered as gifts inter vivos, it could

be argued by the children that these gifts exceeded the one-third
of his property of which the father had the free disposition, and
that the beneficiary must return to the forced heirs two-thirds of
the premiums paid.50 Or, assume that this father makes this
insurance payable to one favored child, again leaving nothing
else at his death. It could be contended by the unfavored children that the premiums paid were gifts to the favored child in
advance of his share, and that the amount of the premiums should
be returned by him to the estate for collation, that is, for equal
division among the three children. 51
Even though no case might arise where all the father's means
were consumed in premium payments under the circumstandes
as described, it might very well be that a sufficiently substantial
portion of his resources could be involved to justify the proportionate reduction called for by the civil code. While it will be
interesting to observe the development of the jurisprudence if
and when an appropriate case reaches the courts, the careful
estate planner will use caution to avoid supplying the test case.
INSURANCE FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE

An opportunity for the use of life insurance to meet a special
purpose is presented by the obligation upon a Louisiana citizen
to observe the rules of forced heirship in disposing of his estate
by gift or by will; examples of this application of insurance
occur fairly frequently in the experience of lawyers and underwriters. Let it be imagined that a small merchant or manufacturer has practically everything he owns in his business, as is so
49. Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).

50. Gifts that exceed the portion which the donor may give freely, the
"disposable portion," are not null, but merely reducible. Art. 1502, La. Civil
Code of 1870.

51. Art. 1227, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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often the case. He has two children, a son who works with him
and a daughter of marriageable age. He is anxious that his son
inherit the business, as he is best fitted to continue it successfully,
provided he is not interfered with by some future brother-in-law.
The father could not bequeath the business to the son alone as
he would thereby leave nothing for the daughter, who is entitled
to her legitime. Life insurance can solve the problem; if sufficient insurance is taken by the father, made payable to his estate,
he can, by his will, leave the business to the son and the proceeds
of the insurance to the daughter. It would not suffice to make
the insurance payable directly to the daughter; proceeds of
insurance in favor of a child would not be counted a part of the
child's legitime. 52 But insurance payable to the estate forms part
of the estate; 53 the proceeds can be disposed of by will and the
child receiving a legacy thereof must apply it on his legitime.
In making the insurance payable to the estate, there is necessarily
sacrificed the exemption from Louisiana inheritance tax on policies payable to named beneficiaries5 4 and the exclusion of one-half
of such insurance from the federal estate tax where the premiums are paid from community funds, under deLappe v. Commissioner. But the careful attorney or underwriter, who is making the estate plan, will point out the tax factor to the prospective
insured, so that it can be determined whether the advantage of
the entire program outweighs the added tax cost.
One caution must be observed in ascertaining the amount
of insurance needed for such a purpose as has been described.
Since insurance payable to the estate, when taken out during
marriage, falls into the community, 55 it must be remembered that
one-half of the proceeds will be the property of the wife and not
subject to the testamentary disposition of the father's will. Therefore, the plan would require that twice the amount of insurance
needed to furnish any child's legitime must be purchased, if the
insured is married when the policy is issued. If the father in
52. Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).

53. Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902); Succession of
LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917).
54. Life insurance payable to a designated beneficiary is not an inheritance, and, therefore, not subject to tax. Succession of Hedden, 140 So. 851
(La. App. 1932). But insurance payable to the estate is part of the estate,
inherited as such, and subject to inheritance tax. State v. Succession of
Brewer, 190 La. 810, 182 So. 820 (1938).
55. Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902); Succession of
LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917).
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question is divorced or is a widower at the time, the single
amount of insurance needed would suffice.
ANNUITY CONTRACTS

The discussion, up to this point, has been directed solely to
life insurance. Recent developments in the Louisiana jurisprudence have laid down an entirely different treatment for annuity
contracts. Until 1942 it had been assumed in ordinary practice
that annuities, whether originally purchased as such or as the
result of conversions of life policies, were subject to the same
rules of interpretation as those pertaining to life insurance. However, a decision of the supreme court in Succession of Rabouin,5 6
completely differentiated the treatment of annuities. The deceased
carried a number of annuity contracts providing that any unpaid
balance of the consideration at his death was payable to one of
his children. His will also left to this child the portion of his
estate of which he was permitted to dispose, in addition to her
legitime as forced heir. The other children attacked the designation of the favored child as beneficiary to receive the terminal
refund, contending that this value formed part of their father's
estate, and that they were entitled to their legitime therein. The
court rejected the beneficiary's contention that the proceeds of
the annuity contract were similar to those of life policies. It was
pointed out that while the proceeds of insurance to a named
beneficiary does not come into existence during the lifetime of
the insured and thus form no part of his estate, payment under
an annuity contract, on the contrary, is of a fund which "belonged
to the annuitant during his lifetime." The court, therefore, held
that the unpaid value in the contracts was part of the estate of
the insured for the purpose of computing the legitime of his
forced heirs.
As a logical consequence of the Rabouin holding, the supreme
court in 1945 decided, in Succession of Pedrick,57 that the balance
due under a refund annuity contract was also part of the decedent's estate for the purpose of inheritance taxation, even though
payable to a designated beneficiary.
In a per curiam following the opinion in the Pedrick case,
the court emphasizes that these two decisions do not propose to
hold anything beyond the two issues presented for decision, that
56. 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).

57. 207 La. 640, 21 So. 2d 859 (1945).
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the balance due under the annuity contract was part of the
annuitant's estate subject to the rules of forced heirship and
subject to inheritance tax. However, it can be anticipated that
the doctrines announced in the two opinions may be extended,
when the cases arise, to cover other situations. For instance, the
rules of community property might easily be applied to the
balance due on a refund annuity contract when the contract was
taken out during the marriage. Since the fund "belonged to the
annuitant during his lifetime," it would have been, as to the
spouses, part "of the estate which they may acquire during the
marriage.15 8 Thus, if the beneficiary named to receive the unpaid
balance of the consideration at the annuitant's death was anyone
other than his estate or his wife, the wife would probably be
able to claim half of the refund as part of her community interest.
The rules of collation might also be applied to the designation of one of the annuitant's children to receive the terminal
refund, even where such designation does not represent a gift in
excess of the disposable portion as was the situation in the
Rabouin case. If the annuitant's estate, outside of the annuity
refund, is sufficiently large, it might very well be that the children not participating in the contract would receive their legitime
out of other assets. But the designation of one child as the beneficiary of the contract refund would be an advantage in his favor
over his brothers and sisters, and unless such designation was
interpreted by the court as an expression of the parent's intention
that this child receive the amount as an extra portion, he might
be required to collate the proceeds with his co-heirs, that is, to
return it to the mass of the estate for equal division. Of course,
the parent could, by his will or otherwise, express his intention
that the fund is not to be collated.5 9
PENSION TRUSTS

Problems similar to those arising from the designation of
beneficiaries to receive the unpaid balances of annuity contracts
will undoubtedly affect the settlement of amounts due under
pension plans and pension trusts, on the death or the divorce of
an employee. To the extent that the benefits under such programs can be considered as life insurance, strictly speaking, the
rules applicable to life contracts, considered hereinabove, would
58. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870.
59. Art. 1231, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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probably govern. Thus the designation of a beneficiary of proceeds definable as life insurance would not be affected by any of
the rules of the civil code pertaining to community property,
forced heirship, collation and other restrictions upon the insured.
But, to the extent that the benefits represent the equivalent of
an annuity, it is likely that the doctrines laid down in Succession
of Rabouin and Succession of Pedrick, and the probable extensions thereof, would apply with full force. And it is likely that
no distinction would be drawn between funds created by the
employee's contributions and those arising from payments by the
employer. In the latter case, since the employer's share of the
cost is assumed-in consideration of the employee's services, it
ought to follow that the employee thereby is receiving additional
earned compensation for his efforts, representing "produce of
the reciprocal industry and labor of both husbandand wife,"60
and, therefore, community property. The pension amount, or
other benefit, paid to the employee during his lifetime would
be clearly community; any unpaid balance to his credit at his
death should, by the same token, form part of the community
property of which his wife would be entitled to half, and the
other half, falling into his estate, would most likely be subject
to the rules of collation and forced heirship, as well as inheritance tax.
It would, therefore, well behoove attorneys and underwriters
setting up pension plans, whether by pension trusts or otherwise,
carefully to scrutinize the designation of any beneficiary other
than the employee's wife or estate, and to inquire into the marital
and family status of any employee proposing to designate any
other beneficiary, unless the fund in question is clearly identifiable as nothing other than the life insurance, payable only at
death and based on some accepted mortality expectation. Group
insurance, for example, providing nothing beyond death benefits, would be free of any of the limitations of the civil code.
INSURER PROTECTED

As to all of the various problems which have been discussed,
the insurance company, whether under life policies or annuity
contracts, could hardly find itself involved in any controversy
that might arise, because of recent Louisiana legislation establishing facility of payment rules. Payment by the insurer, whether
60. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870.

LIFE INSURANCE

1951]

on life or endowment policy of annuity contract, to the person
designated therein, fully discharges the insurer, unless, before
payment is made, the insurer has received at its home office
written notice of an adverse claim.6 1 If notice of such adverse
claim is received before payment under the terms of the contract
is made, the insurer's only safe course would then be to interplead the clairiants and deposit the disputed fund in the registry
of the court.
It is thus seen that the underwriter can hardly be in jeopardy
by reason of the conflicts which may62 arise under the various circumstances discussed in this article.
SUMMARY

1. Life insurance proceeds payable to a designated beneficiary are no part of the estate, do not constitute community
property, and are subject to no restrictions (assuming an insurable interest) except the provisions of the policy. If the right
to change the beneficiary is reserved, no beneficiary has any
vested interest in the policy during the insured's life.
2. Life insurance proceeds payable to the estate, whether by
reason of such designation or of the prior death of the named
beneficiary, fall into the estate of the insured. If such policy is
issued during the marriage, the proceeds are community; if the
policy is taken out when the insured is unmarried, the proceeds
are part of his separate estate, notwithstanding a subsequent
marriage.
3. Payment of premiums out of separate or community funds
does not affect the right to the proceeds of life insurance.
4. Where the proceeds of life insurance do not go to the wife
or to the community, the wife has a claim for reimbursement of
one-half of the premiums paid from community funds.
5. The ownership of the cash surrender value, whether
separate or community property, upon the prior death of the
61. La. R.S. (1950) 22:643, re-enacting the Insurance Code of 1948, La. Act
195 of 1948.

62. The facility of payment statute (supra note 61) does not purport to
relieve the insurer of its responsibilities under the Louisiana inheritance tax
laws, where the proceeds are taxable, as in the case of life insurance payable
to the estate, and the refund values in annuity contracts. See Purvis, The
Louisiana Insurance Code end Life Insurance, 24 Tulane L. Rev. 168, 175

(1949).

The procedural steps to comply with the requirements of the inheri-

tance tax law, La. R.S. (1950) 47:2416, are probably familiar to all home office
counsel.
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insured's wife, or upon divorce, has not been established by the
courts of Louisiana. The federal taxing authorities hold such
cash surrender value to be community property, for estate tax
purposes.
6. Children and other forced heirs have no right to the proceeds of life insurance, except as they form part of the estate
when payable to the estate. Forced heirs probably are entitled
to recover from a beneficiary that proportion of the premium
paid which represents gifts by the insured in excess of the disposable portion of his estate, and children may have the right to
demand collation of such premiums among themselves when one
of them is favored over the other by designation as the beneficiary.
7. Life insurance can be utilized to advantage, in estate
planning, to provide an addition to the insured's estate to satisfy
the shares of forced heirs, and permit the bequest of other property as the insured might think best.
8. Refund values in annuity contracts form part of the estate
of the annuitant, at least insofar as the rights of forced heirs
and liability for inheritance tax are concerned. It is probable that
such refund values would also be declared community property
when the annuity is taken out during marriage.
9. Benefits under pension plans and pension trusts would
probably follow the respective rules applicable to life insurance
and to annuities, to the extent that they partake of the characteristics of the one or the other.
10. The facility of payment statute will protect the insurer
against adverse claimants when no notice of such claims is
received before payment. The estate planner, therefore, need
not concern himself with safeguarding the insurer, but should
guide the insured in planning his program so as to achieve the
best possible results and avoid the occasion for litigation within
his family after his death.

